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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM G. VANDEVER & COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
JERRY B. BLACK, DDS; 0. BRENT
BLACK, DDS; RANDY R. BLACK, DDS
and ROBERT H. M. KILLPACK, DDS,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 17608

Defendants-Respondents. )
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action by plaintiff, a loan broker, to collect a
commission for obtaining a loan commitment for defendants.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court sitting without a jury.

The

Court entered a judgment of no cause of action, finding that the
plaintiff had not earned the claimed commission.

The Court awarded

defendants' judgment on their counterclaim in the amount of
$2,000.00, being the partial return of a good faith deposit paid
by the defendants to the plaintiff.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants and respondents seek to have the judgment of the
lower court affirmed on appeal.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff William G. Vandever

& Company (hereinafter referred

to as "Vandever") is an Oklahoma corporation engaged in the loan
brokering business.

Defendants and respondents (hereinafter

referred to as "Defendants") are four dentists engaged in the
practice of dentistry in Salt Lake County.

The transaction which

is the subject of this lawsuit was the defendants' first venture
into a commercial real estate transaction (T-34).
In 1978, the defendants purchased a parcel of land in Salt
Lake County with the intention of constructing thereon a dental
clinic building.

The defendants had been unsuccessful in obtain-

ing financing for the construction, and became in touch with a Mr.
H. D. Merritt, who was employed by Vandever.

The discussions with

Merritt eventually led to the execution of a written agreement which
was entitled "Authorization to Obtain Financing".

1

Under the agree-

ment, defendants agreed to pay to Vandever a commission based upon
4%

of the loan proceeds in the event Vandever was successful in

obtaining a loan of $397,000.00, "or for such other amounts and/or
terms as may be acceptable to the parties"

2

1

The entire written "Authorization to Obtain Financing" is photocopied at Appendix A at the back of this brief.
This document was
Exhibit 3-P at the trial.
This is the agreement under which Vandever
has sued the defendants.
It is a form agreement used routinely by
Vandever in its brokerage business (T-83) .
2
The quoted phrase is taken from paragraph 2 of the Agreement and
is the salient language relied upon by the trial court.

-2-
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Thereafter, Vandever notified the defendants that it could
not get a loan commitment for $397,000.00 but could get a commitment for $375,000.00.

Vandever then delivered to defendants a

preliminary commitment from American United Life Insurance Company
for $375,000.00 (Exhibit 6-P).

The preliminary commitment, except

for some very minor items, was unconditional.
Although defendants were disappointed about not obtaining the
full financing, 3 they decided to accept the commitment of $375,000.00.
They thereupon wrote a letter of acceptance as they were requested
to do (Exhibit 7-P) , which was accompanied by a good faith deposit
to the committing lender in the amount of $3, 750.00.

The good

faith deposit was in addition to another good faith deposit of
$3,000.00 which had already been paid to Vandever (T-40).
After American United Life Insurance Company received the good
faith deposit, it issued and forwarded to the defendants its final
loan commitment.

However, when the final commitment was issued,

it contained some eight pages of conditions (Exhibit 9-P).
of the conditions were objectionable to the defendants.

Many

Some of

the major conditions that the defendants found unacceptable were
as follows:
1.

The final commitment was not for $375,000.00, but was for

3 The original $397,000.00 had been the parties' estimate for
100% financing, less the cost of the land and architect's fee
(T-37).
From the inception it had been the defendants' goal to
obtain 100% financing (T-36) .
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the lesser of $375,000.00 or 75% of the appraisal on the building
(Exhibit 9-P, page 1).

Since there was insufficient time in which

to obtain an appraisal, defendants would have been forced to accept
a commitment without knowing for sure what the final amount would
be (T-41-43).
2.

The final commitment had no

prepayment option, which was

a matter of concern to the defendants (Exhibit 9-P, page 1; T-43).
3.

The final commitment provided that the loan could not ever

be assigned (Exhibit 9-P, page 6).

This was a matter of concern to

the defendants as they wanted to be able to sell the property in
future years (T-43).
4.

The final commitment prohibited any secondary financing

(Exhibit 9-P, page 7).

This made the package totally unacceptable,

since the defendants knew that they weren't getting 100% financing
and knew that they would have to get secondary financing, thus
making the acceptance of the commitment impossible (T-43).
5.

The final commitment did not provide for construction

financing and the defendants had understood that construction financing would be included (T-36,44).
6.

The final commitment required the defendants to pay all of

the closing costs, lender's attorney's fees and other expenses incurred in connection with the building (Exhibit 9-P, page 7).

This

was of concern to the defendants as they had no idea as to what
these expenses would be (T-44) .
7.

The final commitment was subject to approval and acceptance

of the building after construction (Exhibit 9-P, page 5).

-4-
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Defendants were concerned about the lender arbitrarily not accepting the building after it was built (T-44).
8.

The final commitment required the purchase of insurance

in an undefined amount (Exhibit 9-P, page 4).

This was of concern

to the defendants (T-44).
9.

An item of major importance was the fact that the commit-

ment was conditional upon the entire building being leased at a
rental rate of $9. 75 per square foot (Exhibit 9-P, page 3).

This

was above the current rental value of $8.00 to $8.50 per square
foot.

Defendants did not believe that they could rent the space

for more than its fair market value and didn't want to even try to
ask tenants to pay an inflated rent (T-45).
Prior to receiving the final commitment letter, the defendants
had never been told of the above conditions (T-38,39).
that many of the conditions were unfair (T-62).

They felt

They nevertheless

gave very serious consideration to acceptance of the final commitment, 4 but eventually concluded among themselves that they simply
could not accept it.

They thereupon notifed Merritt that they were

declining the final loan commitment of American United Life Insurance
Company (T-48).

Merritt told them that if they didn't go ahead with

the loan, a lawsuit would be filed by Vandever to collect the commission. (T-49).

This lawsuit then followed.

4 The defendants even met together and signed the agreement, but
it was never delivered to anyone (T-47).
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The initial agreement between Vandever and the defendants
had required defendants to pay a good faith deposit of $3,000.00,
of which $2,000.00 was to be returned if Vandever was unsuccessful
5
. securing
.
.
in
accepta bl e f.inancing.
This was the bas is of defendants'
counterclaim upon which they were awarded judgment for the $2,000.00.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT VANDEVER IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER ANY COMMISSION
The following paragraphs taken from the agreement between the
parties (See Appendix A) set forth the conditions under which
Vandever would be entitled to a commission:
"2. This authorization is for financing in the amount
of $397,000.00, Three Hundred Ninety Seven Thousand Dollars,
for a period of (30) thirty years, with interest at a rate
of not greater than (to be negotiated) % per annum, or for
such other amounts and/or terms as may be acceptable to the
parties.
7.
In consideration of WGV services in negotiating
such financing, the undersigned agree to pay WGV or his
assigns 4% of the total amount of the financing or loan
commitment at the time the commitment is issued to the
undersigned, their principals or agents. WGV's fee will
be considered earned upon the issuance of financing or a
loan commitment by the lending institution(s) and/or
investor(s) in accordance with the terms of aaragraph two
(2) above, and payment of WGV's fee will be ue upon
issuance of same."
(Emphasis added)
After hearing the evidence, the trial court found that the
loan commitment contained numerous conditions that were objectionable; that no loan was ever obtained or offered on terms that were

5

See paragraph 9 of the Agreement at Appendix A.
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acceptable to the defendants; and that the plaintiff was not
entitled to recover any commission (R-87).

These findings are

entitled to the usual presumptions on appeal.

The findings and

judgment are endowed with a presumption of validity; the party
attacking the judgment has the burden of showing that it is in
error; and the evidence and all inferences that fairly and reasonably may be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d, 205,
381 P.2d 86.

The Supreme Court should not substitute its judgment

for that of the trial court on issues of fact when the findings are
based upon substantial, competent and admissible evidence as was
the case here.

Fisher v. Taylor (Utah 1977), 572 P.2d 393.

Also,

the refusal of the trial court to modify the judgment upon motion
for new trial (R-95-110) gives it a further degree of sanctity which
increases the hesitancy in disturbing it upon review.

Schneider v.

Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 35, 327 P.2d 822.
Defendants have no quarrel with the decisions cited in
appellant's brief to the effect that a real estate broker earns
his commission when he produces a buyer who is ready, willing and
able to purchase the listed property for the full amount of the
listing price.

If such a buyer is found, seller is liable for the

commission regardless of whether he actually goes through with the
sale.

However, in comparing real estate cases, it is misleading to

use cases involving offers for the full purchase price.

A much

more analogous situation is where the broker obtains an offer that
is less, or otherwise varies from the listing price.

-7-
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circumstances, the general rule of law may be found at 12 Am.Jur.
2d Brokers, §185, which provides as follows:
"Where a broker, instead of procuring a person who is
ready, able, and willing to accept the terms his princiauthorized him to offer at the time of his employment,
procures one who makes a counter offer more or less at
variance with that of his employer, the latter is at
liberty either to accept the proposed party upon the
altered terms or to decline to do so, without giving
the broker his reasons for the refusal.
If he accepts,
he is legally obligated to compensate the broker for the
services rendered, but if he refuses he incurs no liability
therefor."
The above principle has been applied in the Utah case of
Hansen v. Snell, 11 Utah 2d 644, 354 P.2d 1070.

In Hansen, the

broker delivered an offer where everything was in compliance with
the listing except the rate of interest to be paid on an installment
contract.

The seller insisted upon

10~~

interest and the sale failed

because the buyer was unwilling to pay that rate.

The broker then

sued for his commission claiming that the seller was demanding an
unreasonable rate.

The listing contract was silent as to any

interest rate, and the trial court held with the broker finding
that the seller's demand was unreasonable and that the statutory
interest rate of 6% should apply.

On appeal, the Supreme Court

reversed the decision pointing out that the agreement of the
parties had language to the effect that the sale was to be made
on "terms to suit the seller" and that the interest rate was
clearly a "term".

Since the broker had not satisfied the seller

as to this term, he had not met the conditions that would entitle
him to a commission and there would be no obligation to pay the
broker a commission under those circumstances.

-8-
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that the language "terms to suit the seller" as used in Hansen
is substantially the same as "terms acceptable to the parties" as
used in the instant case.
Other typical recent cases supporting the position of the
defendants are Boyer Company v. Lignell (Utah 1977), 567 P.2d 1112;
Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. Peterson (Utah 1978), 585 P.2d
456; and Allphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine

(Utah 1979), 595 P.2d 860.

In Boyer Company v. Lignell, supra, the broker could not
recover a commission where the offer differed from the listing
agreement and the sale did not go through.

The court made the

following comments in its decision:
"The law is well settled that the broker is not entitled
to a real estate commission until he has a written binding
offer or agreement signed by a ready, willing and able purchaser. This means that all of the terms and conditions
must be agreed upon between the parties. Since all of the
terms were not agreed upon between the parties, no commission was earned."
In Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. Peterson, supra, a
commission was not allowed where the terms of the offer differed
from the listing agreement, even though the seller offered cash.
And in Allphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine, supra, no commission was
allowed where the listing agreement did not require the seller to
accept any offer.

See also Engineering Associates, Inc. v. Irving

Place Associates, Inc.

(Utah 1980), 622 P.2d 784, holding that no

contract existed between a mortgage broker and its customer where
there was never any mutual assent to all of the essential terms.
It is clear from all of the above authorities that the trial
court correctly applied the law.

-9-
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POINT II
APPELLANT'S CLAIMS OF LACK OF COOPERATION, FAILURE TO APPLY
OBJECTIVE OR INDUSTRY STANDARD, AND REPUDIATION OF CONTRACT
ARE WITHOUT MERIT
Under Point III, IV, V and VI of appellant's brief, arguments
are made with respect to claims of lack of cooperation, failure to
apply objective or industry standards, and repudiation

of contract.

These points are completely without merit and may be dealt with in
a summary manner.
Lack of Cooperation.

Appellant has cited no factual conduct

in its brief that would show any lack of cooperation on the part of
defendants.

No evidence was presented of any such conduct.

The

only basis for this claim is the defendant's refusal to accept the
final loan commitment.

The cases are very clear that the refusal

of a seller to accept terms that are objectionable to him does not
constitute lack of cooperation.

Boyer Company v. Lignell, supra;

Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. Peterson, supra.
Objective Standard.

The contract between the parties estab-

lishes as a condition to recovery the procuring of a loan commitment
on "terms as may be acceptable to the parties".
clearly establishes a subjective standard.

This language

Further, the contract

form was a standard printed agreement used by Vandever routinely
in its business (T-83), so if there is any ambiguity in the language
as to the correct standard, the ambiguity must be construed strictly
against the party that drafted the agreement and favorably to the
other party against whom it is invoked.
Realty

Wells Fargo Bank v. Midwest

& Finance Company (Utah 1975), 544 P.2d 882; Wagstaff v.
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Remco, Inc.

(Utah 1975), 540 P.2d 931.

The case of Hansen v. Snell,

supra, would also clearly require the application of a subjective
standard.
However, regardless of the above, the reasons given by the
defendants for declining the loan commitment were not petty or
whimsical, but were very substantial.
for one, but for many reasons.

The loan was declined not

If a reasonable man standard is

applied, the same result would necessarily follow.
Industry Standard.

Appellant claimed in its brief that the

final commitment letter of American United Life Insurance Company
was a "standard" real estate loan commitment.

Respondents do not

seriously believe that there is any such thing as a "standard" real
estate loan.

However, in any event, no evidence was offered at

trial as to any industry standard.

Vandever submitted a pre-trial

witness list (R-57) wherein it listed William H. Starkweather as
an expert witness to testify as to the terms of the financing
commitment.

Mr. Starkweather was never called as a witness.

Cer-

tainly, the factfinder can view with mistrust any allegation

that

is unsupported by available evidence, if any such evidence exists
(see J.I.F.U. §3.13).

Further, there was no evidence whatsoever

that any of the defendants would have had knowledge of any industry
standard, and in fact the affirmative evidence showed that they
were novices in commercial real estate transactions.
Repudiation of Contract.

The contract between the parties

provides by its very terms that after sixty (60) days it may be
cancelled by the defendants upon the giving of ten days notice in

-11-
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writing (see Appendix A).

After the defendants declined to accept

the loan commitment of American United Life Insurance Company, and
after Vandever made threats of suit against them, the defendants
elected through their counsel,

Carl N. Erickson, to cancel the

agreement (See Exhibit 12-P).

The cancellation took place long

after the initial 60-day period.

Under these circumstances, it is

a mystery to the defendants how they could repudiate the contract
by doing something that was specifically authorized.by the written
agreement.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED JUDGMENT
ON DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM
At the inception of the transaction, defendants made a good
faith deposit with Vandever in the amount of $3,000.00.

Paragraph

9 of the agreement between the parties (Appendix A) provides that
$2,000.00 of this amount shall be returned if financing is not
secured.

Inasmuch as no acceptable loan commitment was ever secured

by Vandever for the defendants, they were entitled to the return of
their good faith deposit and the trial court correctly granted to
defendants a judgment on their counterclaim for the $2,000.00.
Engineering Associates, Inc. v. Irving Place Associates, Inc.
(Utah 1980) 622 P.2d 784.
CONCLUSION
Based upon all of the arguments and authorities as cited
herein, respondents and defendants respectfully request that the

-12-
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judgment of the trial court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS, WEST & BROWN
David E. West
1300 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendants-Respondents

-13-
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PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT
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AUTHORIZATION TO 08TAIH FINANCING

~f"'

!lo'\:1~•u..,

T•••• •0· 7••olrl

1. The undersigned, being duly authorized, do hereby exclusively e~ploy, grant,
commission and authorize '.Ji 11 iam G. Vandever & Company, hereinafter referred to as
VGV, for the time period stated in paragraph four (4) of this Authorization and Agreement, to make application (s) on our/w behalf for financing to one or more lending
institutions or investors of '.JGV's selection for the purposes of 8u.1Lc 11l)tj,
A
0 d c... r1' (2.. .s
0
{- I- I c ~
cJ M.. p Ive. x
/ AJ
S' £... t::.
u -,-

c

It is fur~her agreed by and between the parties that any appl ication(s) for financ.ing
to lending institutions or investors during the time -period of this Agreement shall be
submitted solely and exclusively by VGV.

.

a

2.

This Authorization.is for financing in the amount of $
9 7 • 00 O, O 0
t..L....,..,..._J.,..ub. ~ ~~ ~ ~&. TI t<-l.L ~
for a period of(~o) &1rz.:t-L/ 1
years, with interest at a rate of not greater
than Td B e
AJ E 91 u rtJ. r:>=-D
% per annum, or for such other
amounts and/or terms as may be acceptable to the parties.

.;!J..vl'LJ..L,

3. The undersigned agree to make available to '.JGV all documents or documentation
necessary to satisfy the requirements of the lending ins:itution (s)
investor (s)
without cost to VGV to whom application is made on behalf of the undersigned.

or

-

4.

.

This Authorization is effective from the date set forth below and continues
~CJ
days fro::i the date on which '.IG'J has
been furnished with all necessary plans, specifications, leases, contracts, cost
breakdowns, financial statements, appraisals, and all other data reasonably required
by the lender, and thereafter until cancelled in writing by the undersigned.
for an initial period of

S. It is further agreed by and between the parties that this Agreement may be
car.eel led by either party following the expiration of the initial period stated in
paragraph four (4) above upon the other furnishing written notice by registereo mail,
re:urn receipt requested, such cancellation to be effective ten (10) days from date
of mailing, however, in such event it is mutually covenanted and agreed cha: paragraphs
six (6) 2nd seven (7) of this Agreement are not cancellable and will be given full
for~e and effect in the event the undersigned should elect to cancel this Agreement.
6. The undersigned agree that the lending ins ti tut ion (s) or investor (s) they
are placed in contact with or providing the financing or the loan for the purposes
hereinbefore sta:ed may be interested in financing not only subject proposal above but
of various other projects now or in the future. Recognizing that contact with the
lending institution (s) or investor (s) and the undersigned will be arranged by ~GV,
his agents, assigns, or successors, the undersigned agrees to pay WGV the same percentage fee as provided in paragraph seven (7) O(:low of any financing, loans or cor.-•.,,i:ments thereof resulting from or made by WGV contacts or efforts, which, within srx:y
(60) months of this date might be conmitted, made available, or paid to the undersigned, their principals, agents, assigns, successors, or to ~ny person, persons or
.entity affiliated with, associated with, o·...int:d by or owning, controlled by or cont:-oll ing the undersigned, their principals, agents, or assigns.
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I.Ii 11 iam G. Vandever t. <;-··.,any
~Jthorization to ObtalA
nancing

Page Two

(

0

]. In consideration of ~GV services In negotiating such financing, the
undersigned agree to pay WGV or his assigns
% of the total amount
of the financing or loan commitment at the time the commitment is issued to the
undersigned, their principals or agents. WGV's fee will be considered earned upon
the issuance of financing or a loan commitment by the lending institution (s) and/or
investor (s) in accordance with the terms of paragraph two (2) above, and payment
of WGV's fee will be due upon issuance of same •
. 8. The undersigned agrees that upon financing being obtained, the financing
or loan will be guaranteed by:
/SJ-C..C!..11(.
/3.l..A (....l(
13/~uk.

K. i LLpf).. c,J<..

AN p

9. A Good Faith Deposit of$ sOCJO • 0 0
is herewith attached which is to
·be applicable to the financing or \pan fee. If WGV accepts this application, but d~
not secure financing WGV is instructed to refund to the applicants $ Z c:J(J O. O 0
retaining$ /0-0 0 •V 0
, to cover WGV's cost in processing this application.
10. The undersigned acknowledge that in exclusively employing, c~imissioning,
and authorizing WGV to obtain financing, loans, or commitments thereof, that this
Agreement and Authorization was negotiated and accepted .in and shall be governed by
the laws of the State of Oklahoma.
11. The undersigned agree that this Authorization is assignable by WGV and
may be changed only by written agreement and that this Authorization and Agreement
shall not be binding or valid until same is accepted by WGV in its offices at Tulsa,
Oklahoma.
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u/,/-:t

Corp.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

J

I

1;', ;...6
Title~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

Date

• 1979

PLACE CORPORATE
·SEAL HERE
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